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ABSTRACT

Author: Coverdale, Michelle, E. MS
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: The Mnemonic Effect of Choice
Major Professor: James S. Nairne
Making choices during encoding leads to better memory than having the same choices
made for you. Beyond a mnemonic benefit for choosing, our laboratory has shown a
benefit for items that have been chosen over those that are not chosen. Though many
experiments in the fields of memory and education involve a choice component, little
consideration has been paid to how an item’s status as chosen or unchosen affects
memory. Prior research comparing memory for chosen and unchosen items has
confounded choice and congruity, making the source of the recall benefit unclear. We
conducted three experiments to dissociate choice and congruity effects. The first two
experiments manipulated both choice and congruity and showed mnemonic benefits for
chosen words over unchosen words and for congruent words over incongruent words, but
these effects did not interact. In the third experiment, in which participants did not overtly
interact with the word that they were selecting, we replicated the choice and congruity
effects found in the first two experiments. We also compared recall for word-pairs that
were given a “yes” response to those given a “no” response and found both a benefit for
congruent words as well as for word-pairs that were given a “yes” response.
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INTRODUCTION

Our daily lives are filled with choices. During a typical day, we decide what to
buy, what route to take while traveling and what foods to consume. Students choose
which topics to study, how long to spend working on an assignment, and what way to
prepare for an upcoming exam. Choice plays a central role in our lives. It is important to
consider how these decisions affect memory. The effects of choice on memory have
implications for not only general memory theory but also for fields like education and
consumer behavior.
When participants choose which words to study for a test they perform better than
a control group who is assigned those same words to study (Hirano & Ukita, 2003;
Monty & Perlmuter, 1975; Perlmuter, Monty, & Kimble, 1971; Takahashi, 1992, 2002;
Toyota, 2015; Watanabe, 2001; Watanabe & Soraci, 2004). Monty and Perlmuter (1975)
demonstrated that participants performed better in a delayed paired-associate learning
task if they chose a stimulus (or response) from a list of alternatives, after reading each of
the alternatives aloud, compared to when they read the alternatives aloud and studied the
word chosen by the previous participant. This effect, which has been labeled the selfchoice effect, has also been demonstrated using both recognition (Watanabe, 2001;
Watanabe & Soraci, 2004) and free recall (Hirano & Ukita, 2003; Takahashi, 1992, 2002;
Toyota, 2015).
One flaw in this yoked-control methodology is that the participant may select
words that he or she finds more meaningful, familiar, or easier to remember. Because
those words may not be as significant to the yoked partner there are item-selection
concerns. Watanabe and Soraci (2004) addressed this problem by using a “constrained”
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choice encoding paradigm. Subjects saw a prompt (e.g. cloth made from sheep) with
three response alternatives (e.g. cotton, wool, silk) and either had to choose and write the
correct response (i.e., wool) or write down an experimenter circled correct choice. Even
with the constrained choice procedure they found that, in a free recall task, more words
from the “constrained” choice condition were recalled than words from the forced choice
condition.
A choice benefit has also been found in a paradigm in which the stimuli were
initially hidden and not revealed until after a choice had been made. In an experiment by
Murty, DuBrow, and Davachi (2015), participants were presented with hiragana
characters (Japanese writing symbols) that occluded the images of two objects. Below the
left character was the letter “L” and below the right was the letter “R”. On half of the
trials (choice trials) participants made a button press choosing which occluding character
to reveal on the other half of the trials (fixed trials), the choice was made by the
experimenter (the “L” or “R” was highlighted in red font). Pressing the button removed
the occluding mask and revealed the object that the participant needed to remember.
Though participants believed they were viewing only one of the two objects based on
their (or the experimenter’s) selection, in reality, objects were presented in a randomly
predetermined order that was not affected by which button (left or right) was pressed.
Murty et al. found that participants had better recognition memory for objects that had
been studied in the choice condition than those studied in the fixed condition. Even
though the participants could not use any characteristics of the to-be-remembered items
to decide, because the objects were occluded, they showed a mnemonic benefit for those
they believed they had chosen.
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The above-mentioned choice effects are similar to self-directed learning effects,
in which participants exhibit better memory for information learned while controlling
aspects of the learning episode such as presentation order or duration (Markant, DuBrow,
Davachi, & Gureckis, 2014). Voss, Gonsalves, Federmeier, Tranel, and Cohen (2011)
demonstrated a mnemonic benefit for self-directed study in a spatial exploration task. In
an intentional memory task, participants viewed pictures of objects on a grid through a
transparent “window” in a semi-transparent mask. During half the blocks participants
controlled when and where the window moved (self-directed). During the other blocks,
the window was moved by the experimental program based on the decisions of the prior
participant (yoked). Participants showed better item recognition and spatial recall for
objects encountered during the self-directed blocks than those during yoked blocks. Thus,
controlling a study episode may improve recognition and recall for studied items.
However, it was unclear whether the benefits arose from participants controlling aspects
of the study event or other uncontrolled factors such as the amount of attention devoted to
the objects.
In a replication and extension of Voss et al. (2011), Markant et al. (2014)
performed a series of experiments with the goal of incrementally equating the selfdirected and yoked groups to identify the source of the self-directed advantage. First, they
equated attentional coordination by implementing a 600-millisecond delay before each
window movement and by adding a black outline around the window’s next position to
act as an attentional cue. Next, they programmed the window to move in a snaking
pattern so that participants in the self-directed group were no longer able to choose the
order in which to view the objects; instead, they only controlled stimulus onset and
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presentation time. Finally, presentation time of each item was also fixed such that during
the self-directed blocks participants were only able to control when each stimulus would
be presented. In each of these experiments Markant and colleagues (2014) found that
participants who were able to control some aspect of the study episode had better
memory for the stimuli than their yoked partners. In short, they found that merely
allowing participants to choose the onset timing of stimuli improved recognition memory.
These examples demonstrate that there is a mnemonic benefit associated with
making a choice, even if that choice is merely when a stimulus will be presented.
However, frequently when a choice is made it involves the selection of one alternative
over another. What are the mnemonic effects of choice on the chosen and unchosen
items? Many self-choice experiments have participants choose to-be-remembered items
from a set of alternatives, yet memory for the chosen item is rarely compared to that of
the unchosen alternatives. One reason is that these experiments typically employ
intentional memory tasks. If participants are instructed to choose the to-be-remembered
items and do not believe that they will need to remember the alternatives, then the
comparison between chosen and not chosen items is confounded with factors such as
motivation and expectation. These confounds can be eliminated by using an incidental
memory task.
Recently, we observed a recall benefit for words chosen in an incidental memory
task over those that were not chosen (Nairne, Coverdale, Cogdill, & Pandeirada, 2018).
Participants in one condition were asked to imagine that they were moving to a new
home in a foreign land and would need to locate and purchase a new house and transport
their belongings. In another condition, participants were asked to imagine that they were
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stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land and would need to find food and water and
protect themselves from predators in order to survive. Participants were then presented
with pairs of objects (e.g., a drum and a pencil). For each pair, they were asked to select
which one of the two objects would be more useful in the given scenario (survival or
moving). After a 2-minute distractor task, participants were given a surprise free recall
task. We found a survival processing benefit (cf. Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada,
2007)—that is, words that were processed for their usefulness to survival were better
remembered than words that were processed for their usefulness to moving. We also
found a benefit for chosen items; words that were chosen as more useful were better
remembered than the words that were not chosen. The chosen-item benefit did not
depend on whether the choice was made relative to the survival or the moving scenario.
In other words, there were main effects of both condition (survival versus moving) and
choice (chosen versus not chosen), but there was no interaction. These results indicate
that items are more memorable if they are chosen rather than unchosen. The positive
effect of choosing an item on memory is a potentially important effect that has not been
systematically examined in previous work.
Ownership is another area of research that may be related to the effect of choice
on memory. Participants better remember things that they own, even when ownership has
been assigned to them by an experimenter (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae,
2008; Englert & Wentura, 2016; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011; van den Bos,
Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010). For example, in work by Cunningham, Turk,
Macdonald, and Macrae (2008), participants were told to imagine that they had won a
basket of grocery items and took turns sorting, or watching a confederate partner sort,
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items into their basket or their partner’s basket based on a sticker that indicated who had
won the item. There was no actual choice involved—the “stickers” simply identified the
relevant basket—but one set of items was subjectively “owned” by the participant. In a
surprise recognition test, people remembered more of the items that had been assigned to
them as “property” than items that had been assigned to their partner. This finding is
referred to as the mere ownership effect.
However, when choice is added to the typical mere ownership experiment, items
that are chosen tend to be remembered better than items that are merely owned. In
Cunningham, Brady-van den Bos and Turk (2011), participants were given pairs of
grocery items and were required to choose one item for their own basket (owned) and to
place the other into their partner’s basket (not owned). Participants took turns choosing
which object of a pair would be placed in their basket and which would be assigned to
their partner. Cunningham et al. (2011) found that in an old/new recognition task,
participants had better recognition memory for objects that had been self-chosen to be
owned rather than merely owned (i.e., when assigned as “owned” by the other
participant); moreover, the “merely owned” items were not recognized significantly
better than items in any of the other conditions.
A similar pattern of results was found by Cunningham et al. (2011) using an
“illusory” choice paradigm, wherein two participants were each given a 50-number grid
and asked to choose 25 of the numbers that they were told would correspond to the
objects that they could keep; the other 25 corresponded to objects that would be given to
the other participants. Thus, people were not asked to choose actual items; rather, they
merely chose numbers that they believed corresponded to items. In reality, the items were
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assigned randomly and were not determined by the numbers that were selected by the
participants. Following the number selection task, participants performed two
computerized sorting tasks, one that they were told was based on their own decision and
the other one based on their partner’s decisions. They again found that participants
recognized more of the objects that they believed they had selected to own compared to
those that were owned or chosen by the other participant. Considering that the selfchosen items are not only owned, but also chosen during a choice condition (as opposed
to the other-unchosen items that are essentially assigned to the participant), it is not
surprising that they are the most memorable. These results suggest that choice is a
powerful mnemonic variable.
What accounts for the mnemonic benefits associated with choice? One
explanation for the benefit of chosen versus assigned words is that the perception of
control improves cognitive processing generally, including memory (Findley & Cooper,
1983; Henry & Sniezek, 1993; Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010). This explanation can
account for the mnemonic benefits found by Murty et. al (2015) and Markant et al.
(2014) which are otherwise very difficult to explain. In both cases the only difference
between the forced and choice conditions is one minor aspect of control. For Murty et al.
subjects only controlled which occluding mask to remove and in Martkant et al.’s fourth
experiment they only controlled when stimulus presentation would begin. Though this
explanation can account for the benefits of self-choice and self-directed learning it cannot
account for the mnemonic benefit of chosen over unchosen items because for both words
the participant is able to make a selection. In other words, they have control over both
which item to choose and which item not to choose.
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From a general memory perspective, congruity may account for the benefit of
chosen words over unchosen words. Craik and Tulving (1975) suggested that when
stimuli form an integrated unit with the encoding context or question (congruent), they
are better recalled than those that do not (incongruent). For example, Craik and Tulving
found that when participants were asked to judge whether a word (e.g. “friend”) fit into a
sentence (e.g. “The boy met a ____ on the street”), participants later remembered more of
the words that they had given a “yes” response than words that they had given a “no”
response. This effect, originally demonstrated by Schulman (1974), is referred to as the
congruity principle. Though it was originally considered to be an effect of response type
(i.e. a benefit for “yes” responses versus “no” responses), it has since been demonstrated
that it is not the type of response that it crucial, but rather the compatibility of the item
with the context (Marks, McFalls, & Hopkinson, 1992; Staresina, Gray, & Davachi,
2009). Staresina et al. (2009) presented participants with names of items (e.g. cheese) on
color backgrounds and instructed them to imagine each item being the color presented.
Prior to the presentation of each word-color pair, participants were prompted with either
the question “plausible?” or “unusual?”. They then answered “yes” or “no” regarding the
plausibility or unusualness or the word-color combination (e.g. cheese green).
Combinations that were judged as being plausible (“yes”) and usual (“no” to the question
“unusual?”) were considered congruent whereas word-color combinations that were
implausible (“no”) and unusual (“yes”) were incongruent. An effect of congruency was
found such that congruent combinations were better recalled than incongruent
combinations, but there was no effect of response. Put differently, compatibility between
the item and the context (color) improved recall regardless of whether the response was
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“yes” or “no”. Marks et al. (1992) found a similar effect using pictures of scenes and
objects. They found that an image of an object that was consistent with a scene (e.g.
scissors and a barber shop) was more memorable than an inconsistent object (e.g. a dress)
during a cued recall task, regardless of the participant’s response to a prompt about
whether the object fit (or did not fit) in the scene.
Congruity between the object and the scenario is one explanation of the benefit
for chosen words over unchosen words; participants choose the word that is more
congruent with the scenario and that congruity leads to better memory for those words. A
similar interpretation of the self-choice effect was proposed by Toyota and Kobayashi
(2009), who named this the integration hypothesis. They claimed that the key component
in the self-choice effect was a clear “criterion” for choosing. If participants have a wellstructured dimension along which to choose, their choices will be better integrated into
existing cognitive structures and therefore more memorable (Toyota, 2015). When
participants make choices along a dimension (e.g. usefulness to survival) a recall benefit
for the chosen items may potentially be confounded by the congruity of the items.
The purpose of the present research was to better understand the chosen-item
benefit. For example, it is important to separate choice from congruity to see if congruity
explains some or all of the observed advantage for chosen items. Three experiments are
reported that are designed to separate choice from congruity. The goal was to determine
if the effect of choice is independent from or interacts with congruity by having
participants choose in one instance the less congruent of two items and in the other the
more congruent. If they are indeed separate effects, then it is important to know whether
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choosing improves memory for the chosen item or hinders memory for the unchosen
item.
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EXPERIMENT 1

Our first experiment was designed to disentangle congruity from choice. We used
the “two-object” choice paradigm developed by Nairne et al. (2018) in which participants
choose which of two objects is more useful within a given scenario. In previous
experiments using this paradigm, the chosen words were remembered better but they
were also more useful and presumably more congruent with the situation. Therefore, the
mnemonic benefit from choosing a word may have been due merely to congruity. The
goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether choice, the item’s congruity with the
scenario, or a combination of both lead to improved memory for an item. In order to
disentangle these two factors (choice and congruity), the “two-object” choice task was
modified such that in one condition participants choose which of two objects would be
more useful in a survival situation (congruent) and in another condition, they choose
which would be less useful (incongruent). With this design, we were able to look at the
effect of choice (chosen versus not chosen) on memory at two levels of congruity
(congruent versus incongruent).
If congruity is the controlling factor then we would expect the chosen items in the
“more useful” condition and the not-chosen items in the “less useful” condition to be
remembered well—both are more congruent with the scenario. On the other hand, if
choice is important then we would expect chosen items to be remembered well regardless
of condition—e.g., the chosen items in the “less useful” condition should be remembered
better than the not-chosen items in the “more useful” condition. A main effect of
congruity but not choice would suggest that the observed mnemonic benefit of choosing a
word was due to a word’s fit with the situation, and not the act of choosing. A main effect
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of choice and no main effect of congruity would suggest that the act of choosing was
responsible for the obtained memory benefit. Main effects of both congruity and choice
with no interaction between the two would suggest that the observed choice effects were
caused both by the act of choosing and the word’s congruity independently of each other.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight Purdue University undergraduates (25 females, 23 males) were
recruited from an introductory psychology class and participated in exchange for partial
course credit. Only native English speakers were included in the analyses and participants
were run in groups of one to four.
Materials
The experiment was completed on individual computers using the keyboard and
mouse to respond. Each session lasted fewer than 30 minutes. Twenty-four two-object
pairs (e.g. pencil and drum) were used. All forty-eight words were manipulable objects
with familiarity, concreteness and imageability values above 450 based on normative data
from the Medical Research Council (MRC) Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988).
All participants saw the same pairs of words, which are shown in Appendix A.
Word-pairs were divided into four blocks of six pairs. Block order was held
constant across all participants, such that each person saw the same set of six pairs in the
first block regardless of the decision type (more useful or less useful). However, within
each block presentation order of the pairs was randomized.
For half of the pairs participants chose the word that they thought would be more
useful (M) in a survival situation and the other half the word that they thought would be
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less useful in a survival situation (L). Decision type alternated between blocks and was
counterbalanced such that half of the participants made a “more useful” judgement first
and the other half made a “less useful” judgement first (i.e. half did MLML and half did
LMLM). The choice task was followed by a 2-minute even/odd parity task. After the 2minute distractor task, participants were given a 5-minute surprise free recall task. Except
for the counterbalancing of the decision type across the block and ordering of the pairs
within each block, all other variables were held constant across participants.
Procedure
At the start of the experiment, participants were told that they would be
performing a series of tasks on the computer. Before each block of choices and before
each task, instructions were presented. For both types of decisions (more/less useful),
participants made their choices about the same survival situation. The survival situation,
and instructions for the two types of decisions, were as follows:

Survival Situation “We would like you to imagine that you are
stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival
materials. Over the next few months, you’ll need to find steady supplies of
food and water and protect yourself from predators.”
More Useful “We are going to show you pairs of words,
representing objects, and we would like you to decide which of the two
objects would be MORE useful to you in the survival situation.”
Less Useful “We are going to show you pairs of words,
representing objects, and we would like you to decide which of the two
objects would be LESS useful to you in the survival situation.”
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Before the first block of both decision tasks (more/less useful), participants
performed two practice trials. These trials were excluded from all analyses. Each pair of
objects was accompanied by the prompt “Which is MORE (or LESS) useful in the
survival situation?”. Participants had 5 seconds per pair of objects to decide. Participants
made their choices by clicking, with the mouse, on the word that they wished to select. In
total, participants made 24 decisions, 12 for each type (more/less useful).
The encoding task was followed by a 2-minute distractor task. During this task
participants saw a single digit number on the screen for 2 seconds and made a parity
judgment by clicking on either the word “even” or “odd” presented below the number.
Following the distractor task, participants were given a 5-minute surprise free recall task.
Participants were asked to recall the names of all the objects that were encountered
during the experiment, regardless of whether the item had been chosen or not. The recall
instructions were as follows:

Recall Instructions “During this experiment, you were asked to
make choices about pairs of objects.
Now, we would like to see if you can remember all of the objects
that you made decisions about throughout this experiment. Try to
remember all of the objects regardless of the choices you made.
Type the objects that you saw in any order you like. You do not
have to remember them in pairs or based on the type of decision you made
about them. We just want you to remember as many individual objects as
you can.”
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Participants typed the names of the objects that they recalled into a text-box
which was visible on the screen for the entire duration of the recall task.
Results and Discussion
For all analyses, we set alpha = .05 (two-tailed), unless otherwise noted. For the
purpose of these comparisons we considered words that were chosen in the “more useful”
condition and not chosen in the “less useful” condition to be “congruent”. Words that
were not chosen in the “more useful” condition or chosen in the “less useful” condition
were considered to be “incongruent”. Therefore, we had four categories of words:
chosen, congruent; not chosen, congruent; chosen, incongruent; not chosen, incongruent.
The results of main interest are shown in Figure 1. Consistent with previous
experiments, participants recalled a greater proportion of chosen objects (M = .46, SD =
.12) than not chosen objects (M = .39, SD = .13). Using a repeated measure analysis of
variance (ANOVA) we found both a main effect of choice (F(1, 47) = 10.35, p < .01,
MSE = .02, η2 = .18) and a main effect of congruity (F(1, 47) = 25.41, p < .001, MSE =
.03, η2 = .35) but no interaction between choice and congruity, F(1, 47) = .65, p = .43,
MSE = .02, η2 = .01. In other words, objects that were chosen were more memorable than
objects that were not chosen, and objects that were congruent with the survival situation
were more memorable than incongruent objects. The effect of choice on recall was the
same for both congruent and incongruent words.
As a manipulation check we compared the proportion of times a word was chosen
in the “more useful” condition to the proportion of times that same word was not chosen
in the “less useful” condition and found that the two were highly correlated (r = .92 p <
.001). Put simply, if participants chose an object in the “more useful” condition, then that
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Free Recall Experiment 1
0.7
■ Chosen
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Figure 1. Free recall performance by choice and congruity. Congruent-Chosen is the
proportion recall for words chosen in the “more useful” condition. Congruent-Not
Chosen is the proportion of recall for words not chosen in the “less useful” condition.
Incongruent-Chosen is the proportion recall for words chosen in the “less useful”
condition. Incongruent-Not Chosen is the proportion of recall for words not chosen in the
“more useful” condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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same object was very likely not to be chosen in the “less useful” condition. This suggests
that participants were analyzing the items in the same way across the two instruction
conditions—e.g., they were making a relative usefulness judgment and then deciding
which item to choose based on the instructions. In other words, the “congruent” words
comprised one set of words and the “incongruent” another.
Response times, the time in seconds from the stimulus onset to the first mouse
click, for the “more” and the “less” task were also compared. Participants were
significantly faster to make a choice in the “more” task (M = 2.73 s, SD = .37) than in the
“less” task (M = 2.94 s, SD = .43), t(47) = 3.70, p < .001. Response time can be used as
an indicator of task difficulty – that is, participants will take longer to respond when they
are doing a more difficult task. This suggests that it may have been more difficult for
participants to do the “less” task than to do the “more” task. However, we found no recall
differences between the “more” task (M = .43, SD = .12) and the “less” task (M = .42, SD
= .12), t(47) = .75, p > .1, suggesting that the response time differences cannot account
for the observed pattern of results.
In sum, we found that congruity and choice both benefit recall but do not interact.
This suggests that the choice effect found in previous experiments, was due only partially
to congruity effects. In other words, something beyond congruity increases chosen items’
memorability.
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EXPERIMENT 2

As noted above there was a strong correlation (r = .92, p < .001) between the
words chosen in the “more useful” condition and those not chosen in the “less useful”
condition. This pattern indicates that the main effect of choice was not an artifact of item
selection, because the same words were being compared for both the chosen and not
chosen conditions. However, a main effect of congruity could potentially be the result of
item-selection – the set of words that were deemed as more useful was a more memorable
set of words than the less useful words but not necessarily because of their congruity. In
order to rule out item-selection as an explanation of the main effect of congruity in
Experiment 2 we manipulated the congruity for each word.
This experiment was designed to fix the item-selection problem and replicate the
choice effect from Experiment 1. As before, participants saw pairs of words and selected
one of the words based on a provided prompt. However, rather than seeing a prompt
regarding the usefulness of each object to survival, each pair of words was accompanied
by a category description that applied to only one of the two words. For example, a
participant might see the words “golf” and “boot” accompanied by the category “a sport”
and they would need to choose the word that is either more representative of the category
(golf) or less representative of the category (boot). Crucially, we manipulated the
category prompt between subjects such that half of the participants saw prompts that
were congruent with one set of words while the other half of participants saw prompts
that were congruent with the other set of words; in this way, each word participated as
both a congruent and an incongruent item across participants.
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Method
Participants
We performed a statistical power analysis to estimate sample size for this
experiment based on the choice effect found in Experiment 1, f(U) = .0.47. Using
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) the estimated sample size for 2
groups (congruent and incongruent) with 2 measurements (chosen and not chosen) with
alpha = .05 and power = .95 is N = 641.
Sixty-four Purdue University undergraduates (26 males, 38 females) participated
in exchange for partial course credit. As described in Experiment 1, participants were run
in groups of one to four in sessions lasting fewer than 30 minutes, and only nativeEnglish speaking participants were included in the analyses.
Materials
Forty word and category stimuli were selected from the Van Overschelde,
Rawson, and Dunlosky category norms (2004; see Appendix B). The 40 words were
paired together into 20 word-pairs that were presented in blocks of five. Decision criteria
(more representative or less representative) alternated between blocks and was
counterbalanced between subjects such that half of the participants selected the more
representative word (M) first and the other half selected the less representative word (L)
first (MLML and LMLM respectively). Each word-pair had two category descriptions,
one congruent and one incongruent, for each word (see Appendix B). Half of the
descriptions were presented in one version (A) and the other half were presented in the
other version (B), such that each word was congruent in one version while it was
incongruent in the other. Version (A or B) was also counterbalanced between subjects,
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resulting in four counterbalance conditions that each had 16 subjects. The length of the
category description (measured in number of characters) was matched between the two
versions. The set of words that were congruent in version A did not differ significantly
from those in version B in their average word length, familiarity, concreteness, or
imageability (Wilson, 1988). Importantly, the words in the two versions were also
matched for their category representativeness, as measured for each word by the average
number of subjects in Van Overschelde et al. (2004) who responded with that word when
given the category as a cue. As in Experiment 1, the set of word-pairs in each block was
held constant across participants but presentation order within blocks was randomized.
All other materials were as described in Experiment 1.
Procedure
On arrival participants were seated at individual computers and verbally
instructed that they would be performing a series of tasks on the computer. Instructions
were presented on the computer screen before each task, and before each of the four
blocks of the choice task. The instructions for the two types of choice task were as
follows:

More Representative: “In this task, we are going to show you pairs
of words along with a description of a category. For each pair of words,
we would like you to choose the word that is MORE representative of the
category. You will make your choice by using the mouse to click on the
word you choose to select.”
Less Representative: “In this task, we are going to show you pairs
of words along with a description of a category. For each pair of words,
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we would like you to choose the word that is LESS representative of the
category. You will make your choice by using the mouse to click on the
word you choose to select.”

Participants performed two practice trials before the first block of each of the two
decision tasks (more/less) for a total of 4 practice trials overall. These trials were
excluded from all analyses. For each pair of words, the prompt “Which is MORE (or
LESS) representative of the category?” appeared at the top of the screen, and below the
prompt was the category. Under the category label were the two target words.
Participants made choices by using the mouse to click the word that they wished to select.
In total, participants made 20 decisions, 10 for each decision type (more/less
representative).
The distractor task was identical to the one described in Experiment 1. For the
recall test, participants were asked to recall the names of all the objects that they made
decisions about during the experiment, regardless of whether the item had been chosen or
not. They were also instructed that they did not need to remember the category that the
words were presented with, only the individual words. Each participant was given 5
minutes to recall as many words as possible.
Results and Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to replicate Experiment 1 while also fixing the
item-selection problem. We predicted that we would find the same pattern of results as in
the prior experiment such that congruent words would be more memorable than
incongruent words and chosen words would be more memorable than not chosen words.
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We also anticipated that these two effects (choice and congruity) would not interact with
one another.
The main results of interest are shown in Figure 2. We used a repeated measure
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare the four categories of words: chosen,
congruent; not chosen, congruent; chosen, incongruent; not chosen, incongruent. We
replicated the effects found in Experiment 1. There was both a main effect of choice (F(1,
63) = 8.34, p < .01, MSE = .01, η2 = .12) and a main effect of congruity (F(1, 63) =
83.51, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2 = .57) but no interaction between choice and congruity
(F(1,63) = .26, p = .61, MSE = .03, η2 = .004). Words that were chosen were more
memorable than those that were not chosen, and words that were congruent with the
presented category were more memorable than words that were incongruent with the
presented category. The effect of congruity on recall did not vary based on whether the
word had been chosen or not.
As in Experiment 1, participants were faster to respond in the “more” task (M =
2.14 s, SD = .44) than in the “less” task (M = 2.26 s, SD = .52), t(63) = 2.58, p < .05. The
response time differences between the two tasks did not lead to recall differences
between the words processed in the “more” task (M = .19, SD = .11) and “less” task (M =
.20, SD = .12), t(63) = .51, p > .1.
One might notice that the recall levels are much lower for this experiment than
they were for Experiment 1 despite the fact that fewer words were presented. There are
several reasons why this may be the case. Experiment 1 used survival processing for the
encoding task. Survival processing is a powerful encoding technique which is known to
lead to better memory than most other deep processing tasks (Nairne, Pandierada, &
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Figure 2. Free recall performance by choice and congruity. Congruent-Chosen is the
proportion recall for words chosen in the “more representative” condition. Congruent-Not
Chosen is the proportion of recall for words not chosen in the “less representative”
condition. Incongruent-Chosen is the proportion recall for words chosen in the “less
representative” condition. Incongruent-Not Chosen is the proportion of recall for words
not chosen in the “more representative” condition. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean.
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Thompson, 2008). The lower recall in this experiment may also be due in part to the
stimuli used in this experiment. In Experiment 1 all stimuli were the names of concrete
objects that had familiarity (M = 557.40), concreteness (M = 594.48) and imageability (M
= 589.46) values above 450. In the present experiment, though many of the stimuli were
objects, some were abstract concepts (e.g. week) and they had lower average familiarity
(M = 538.95), concreteness (M = 571.38) and imageability (M = 564.88) values than the
words used in Experiment 1. An additional factor that may have contributed to the low
recall levels observed in this experiment is that unlike in Experiment 1, in which
participants encoded all words relative to a common dimension (their usefulness to
survival), participants had no sematic dimension along which to relate all the words. Not
having a common dimension along which to encode the words may have made it more
difficult to recall the words because the encoding dimension could not be used as a cue
for recall. However, despite the low recall levels in this experiment, we still found the
same pattern of effect that we observed in Experiment 1.
A programming error, which resulted in the correct answer appearing 12 times on
one side of the screen and only 8 times on the other, was found after the data for this
experiment were collected. This meant that half of the participants saw more correct
words on the left side of the computer screen and the other half of participants saw more
correct words on the right side of the computer screen. Collapsing across participants, the
correct answer appeared the same number of times on both sides of the screen. Although
we have no theoretical reason to anticipate that this confound should affect either the
main effect of choice or the main effect of congruity, we performed an additional
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repeated measures ANOVA and included which side had more correct answers (“side”)
as a between-subjects factor.
We found no significant effect of side on recall (F(1, 62) = 2.83, p = .10, MSE =
.028, η2 = .04) such that participants recalled an equal number of words when they saw
more correct answers on the right side of the screen than on the left side of the screen.
There was also no interaction between the effect of choice and side (F(1, 62) = .28, p >
.10, MSE = .01, η2 = .004), or the effect of congruity and side (F(1, 62) = 3.17, p > .05,
MSE = .009, η2 = .05) such that the effects of choice and congruity were the same for
participants who saw more correct answers on the right and those who saw more correct
answers on the left. There was also no 3-way interaction between choice, congruity and
side (F(1, 62) = .45, p > .10, MSE = .03, η2 = .007). With side included as factor in the
ANOVA there was still a main effect of choice (F(1, 62) = 8.24, p < .01, MSE = .01, η2 =
.12) and a main effect of congruity (F(1, 62) = 86.38, p < .001, MSE = .009, η2 = .58)
with no interaction between choice and congruity (F(1, 62) = .26, p > .10, MSE = .03, η2
= .004). These results indicate that having more correct answers appear on one side of the
screen did not change the effects of choice or congruity or their interaction. As such, the
factor of side does not change our interpretation of the results.
An important feature of this experiment is that we manipulated both the congruity
and level of choice (chosen/not chosen) for each word by making one word of each pair
objectively the correct answer. Participants were highly accurate when making their
choice. The correct response was made 99% of the time (SD = .03). This means that
when we compare conditions, we are comparing recall of virtually the same words under
four different conditions. This experiment eliminates any item-selection concerns.

26
Overall, this experiment provides additional evidence that the choice effects found in
Nairne et al. (2018) and Experiment 1 were not exclusively due to congruity effects. This
is also evidence that there is something other than congruity that improves memory for
chosen items.

27

EXPERIMENT 3

If chosen items are indeed more memorable than unchosen items, as Experiments
1 and 2 suggest, what accounts for this advantage? One possibility is that when words are
selected memory for those words is improved. Alternatively, it may be that not choosing
(i.e., rejecting) inhibits recall for unchosen words. An alternative explanation is that what
appears to be a choice effect is really an artifact of the way participants perform the
choice task – that is, when a participant uses the mouse to select a word they spend more
time looking at that word (because they are coordinating their mouse movement in that
direction) which leads to the observed mnemonic benefit.
For our third experiment, we wanted to explore these possible explanations for the
chosen-item benefit. This experiment had two goals. One goal was to see if a choice
effect would still be obtained without having participants click directly on the word. The
other was to examine whether being chosen increases an item’s memorability, and/or if
being unchosen decreases its memorability relative to a baseline condition.
To accomplish these goals, we made two changes to Experiment 2. First, we
altered the choice task such that participants no longer clicked on the word that they
wished to select, instead they clicked on either the word “left” or “right” to make their
selection. Second, we included a new yes/no task to act as a baseline comparison. This
new task involved the participant responding by clicking either “yes” or “no” to answer a
question (e.g. “Is golf MORE representative of the category than boot”) about which of
the two words is more (or less) representative of the category (e.g. a sport). This task was
adopted because we needed a baseline condition that required participants to make the
same type of judgement about the object as in the two-object choice condition without
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selecting one of the words over the other. By making this comparison we hoped to
identify the source of the choice effect. That is, we wanted to see whether it was an
enhancement for the chosen words or a detriment for the not chosen words that led to the
differences in the two conditions.
Method
Participants
We performed a statistical power analysis to estimate sample size for this
experiment based on the choice effect found in Experiment 2, f(U) = .0.37. The estimated
sample size for 4 groups (chosen, not chosen, yes and no) and 2 measurements
(congruent and incongruent) with alpha = .05 and power = .95 is N = 104.
One-hundred and four (43 males, 61 females) Purdue University undergraduate
students, who were native English-speakers, participated in exchange for partial course
credit in an introductory psychology class. As in the prior two experiments, groups of one
to four people were run in sessions lasting fewer than 30 minutes.
Materials
The stimuli used in this experiment were the same as those were used in
Experiment 2. Task type (yes/no and left/right) was manipulated between subjects such
that half of the participants did the two-object choice task and the other half made yes/no
judgements. The choice task was the same as it had been in Experiment 2 except that
participants were asked to click on the word “left” or “right,” which appeared below the
target words, to make their choices.
The yes/no task was very similar to the choice task except that instead of seeing
the more/less prompt, the category, and a word pair, participants saw the category and a
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question asking if one word was more/less representative of the category than the other
(e.g. “Is golf MORE representative of the category than boot”). Participants responded by
clicking either the word “yes” or “no” to make their decision. All other aspects of the
materials were the same as those reported in Experiment 2.
Procedure
Participants received instructions at the start of the experiment, and before each
block and task. The instructions for the four tasks (yes/no-more; yes/no-less; left/rightmore; left/right-less) are as follows:

Left/right-More: “In this task, we are going to show you pairs of
words in bold along with a description of a category. For each pair of
bolded words, we would like you to choose the word that is MORE
representative of the category. You will make your choice by using the
mouse to click on either the word “Left” or “Right” to indicate which
word you wish to select.”
Left/right-Less: “In this task, we are going to show you pairs of
words in bold along with a description of a category. For each pair of
bolded words, we would like you to choose the word that is LESS
representative of the category. You will make your choice by using the
mouse to click on either the word “Left” or “Right” to indicate which
word you wish to select.”
Yes/No-More: “In this task, we are going to show a series of
categories and questions with two words in bold. Each question will ask if
one of the bolded words is MORE representative of the category than the
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other. We would like you to choose the correct answer to the question,
either "yes" or "no". You will make your choice by using the mouse to
click on the answer you wish to select.
Yes/No-Less: “In this task, we are going to show a series of
categories and questions with two words in bold. Each question will ask if
one of the bolded words is LESS representative of the category than the
other. We would like you to choose the correct answer to the question,
either "yes" or "no". You will make your choice by using the mouse to
click on the answer you wish to select.”

As with the prior two experiments, after the encoding task participants completed 2
minutes of an even/odd distractor task and spent 5 minutes recalling as many words as
possible.
Results and Discussion
This experiment had two goals: First, to rule out the action of clicking on the
word as an explanation for the chosen item effect and second, to compare chosen and not
chosen items against a yes/no baseline. With respect to this first goal, we altered the
choice task such that participants clicked on the words “left” and “right” as opposed to
clicking directly on the word that they were choosing. We found that the choice effect
remained even when participants did not click on the word that they were choosing to
make their selections.
The recall data for the choice conditions are shown in Figure 3. For the two-object
choice task, we replicated the findings of Experiment 2 such that participants
remembered more words that they had chosen than words that they had not chosen (F(1,
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Figure 3. Free recall performance by choice and congruity. Congruent-Chosen is the
proportion recall for words chosen in the “more representative” condition. Congruent-Not
Chosen is the proportion of recall for words not chosen in the “less representative”
condition. Incongruent-Chosen is the proportion recall for words chosen in the “less
representative” condition. Incongruent-Not Chosen is the proportion of recall for words
not chosen in the “more representative” condition. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean.
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51) = 15.24, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2 = .23), and they remembered more categorycongruent words than category-incongruent words (F(1, 51) = 89.81, p < .001, MSE =
.01, η2 = .64), but these two effects did not interact (F(1, 51) = .91, p > .10, MSE = .03,
η2 = .02). As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants took significantly longer to make their
decisions in the “less” task (M = 2.34 s, SD = .50) than they did in the “more” task(M =
2.13 s, SD = .47), t(51) = 3.76, p < .001, but there were no recall differences between the
“more” (M = .19, SD = .11) and “less” (M = .17, SD = .11) conditions t(51) = .92, p > .10.
This experiment provides evidence that neither the congruity effect nor the choice effect
is dependent on participants clicking on the target words to make their choices. This
suggests that the choice effect is not merely an artifact of participants physically clicking
on the word that they are selecting.
As in Experiment 2, half of the participants saw more correct answers on the left
side of the screen (and thus clicked on the word “left” more often) and the other half saw
more correct answers on the right side of the screen (and thus clicked on the word “right”
more often). Despite the confound, however, the observed pattern of effects remained the
same when side was included in the ANOVA as a between-subjects factor – that is, there
were main effects of choice (F(1, 50) = 15.00, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2 = .23) and
congruity (F(1, 50) = 91.23, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2 = .65) but no interaction between
choice and congruity (F(1, 50) = .89, p > .01, MSE = .03, η2 = .02). There was also no
main effect of side (F(1, 50) = .04, p > .10, MSE = .02, η2 = .001), such that participants
who clicked “left” more often did not recall more words than those who clicked “right”
more often. Side did not interact with either the main effect of choice (F(1, 50) = .20, p >
.10, MSE = .01, η2 = .004) or the main effect of congruity (F(1, 50) = 1.80, p > .10, MSE
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= .01, η2 = .04), nor did it form a 3-way interaction with choice and congruity (F(1, 50) =
.18, p > .10, MSE = .03, η2 = .002). In other words, there was no effect of having more
correct answers appear on one side of the screen on the pattern of results.
The second goal of this experiment was to compare recall of chosen and not
chosen items to recall of items that were neither chosen nor unchosen. To do this we had
half of the participants perform a yes/no judgment task in which they responded “yes” or
“no” to questions about which of two words was more or less representative of a
category. Though congruity effects were originally conceptualized as a mnemonic benefit
for yes responses over no responses, both Staresina et al. (2009) and Marks et al. (1992)
found an effect of contextual congruity and no effect of response (yes/no) in paradigms
designed to manipulate both response and congruity. In other words, they found
mnemonic benefits for congruent items over incongruent items but no difference between
“yes” and “no” responses.
Based on those findings we did not predict a recall difference between response
types. That is, we did not anticipate that pairs of words would be recalled better if the
question asked about them was given a “yes” response. However, we found a marginally
significant mnemonic benefit for word-pairs (i.e. both the congruent and incongruent
words) that received a “yes” response (M = .21, SD= .12), over those that received a “no”
response (M = .17, SD = .10). Items that were part of “true” questions (“Is golf is more
representative of the category [a sport] than boot”) were recalled better than items that
were part of “false” questions (“Is golf less representative of the category [a sport] than
boot”). Furthermore, when we compared the effects of response and congruity using a
repeated measures ANOVA we found a main effect of congruity (F(1, 51) = 64.12, p <
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.001, MSE = .02, η2 = .56), such that words that were members of the presented category
were more memorable than words that were not members of the presented category, and
a marginal effect of response type (F(1, 51) = 4.00, p = .05, MSE = .02, η2 = .07), such
that words that were given a yes response were more memorable than those that were
given a no response. We found no interaction between response and congruity (F(1, 51) =
.61, p > .10, MSE = .02, η2 = .01) such that the effect of response on recall did not change
between the two levels of congruity (congruent/incongruent). This pattern of results is
similar to what was found in the choice task with the primary difference being that in the
choice task, one word of the pair benefits from being selected, whereas in the yes/no task,
both words in a pair benefit from receiving a yes response. Put differently, the effect of
choice benefits an item whereas the effect of response benefits a pair of items.
An additional similarity between the yes/no task performance and the choice task
is that response times were shorter for the “more” task (M = 3.21 s, SD = .60) than for the
“less” task (M = 3.62 s, SD = .76), t(51) = 5.35, p < .001. As in the choice task, this
response time difference did not yield recall differences between the “more” (M = .19, SD
= .11) and the “less” (M = .18, SD = .09) tasks, t(51) = .33, p > .10. It is also worth noting
that response times were significantly slower for the yes/no task (M = 3.4 s, SD = .62)
than they were for the choice task (M = 2.23 s, SD = .44), (t(102) = 11.17, p < .001)
suggesting that the choice task may have been an easier task than the yes/no task.
However, once again this difference did not lead to recall differences between the yes/no
task (M = .18, SD = .08) and the choice task (M = .18, SD = .07), t(102) = .36, p > .10.
The observed benefit for “yes” over “no” suggests that we were not successful at
creating a baseline condition to compare the choice effect against. In fact, it is worth
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Figure 4. Free recall performance by response and congruity. Congruent-Yes is the
proportion recall for words that were given a “yes” response when they were presented
with a congruent category. Congruent-No is the proportion of recall for words that were
given a “no” response when they were presented with a congruent category. IncongruentYes is the proportion recall for words that were given a “yes” response when they were
presented with an incongruent category. Incongruent-No is the proportion of recall for
words that were given a “no” response when they were presented with an incongruent
category. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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considering the similarity of these two effects and the possibility that they might be
different manifestations of the same effect. It may be that the act of endorsing an item,
either by choosing it or by giving it a “yes” response, enhances the recallability of that
item. Whether or not a “yes” over “no” benefit can be considered a type of choice effect
is beyond the scope of these experiments, however, it merits further investigation.
Unfortunately, because recall differed in the yes and no conditions we were unable to use
the yes/no task as an intended baseline condition for comparison.
An additional factor that makes the results of this experiment difficult to interpret
is that due to the same programing error that was present in Experiment 2, half of the
participants made more “yes” responses than “no” responses and the other half made
more “no” responses than “yes” responses. Though this error did not impact the results of
either the choice task in Experiment 2 or the choice task in the current experiment, it did
have a significant impact on the results of the yes/no task. Specifically, we found a
significant interaction between the effect of response (yes/no) on recall and which
response had been selected more times (F(1, 50) = 6.14, p < .03, MSE = .02, η2 = .11)
such that participants who made more “yes” responses showed a larger benefit for “yes”
responses over “no” responses in recall than those who made more “no” responses.
However, there was not a significant overall difference in recall between participants who
made more “yes” responses and participants who made more “no” responses (F(1, 50) =
.33, p > .10, MSE = .03, η2 = .007) and number of “yes” responses did not interact with
either the main effect of congruity (F(1, 50) = .23, p > .10, MSE = .02, η2 = .005) or the
interaction between response and congruity (F(1, 50) = 1.36, p > .10, MSE = .02, η2 =
.03).
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Considering that participants made more of one type of response than the other,
which interacted with the effect of response on recall, it is difficult to interpret the recall
results from the yes/no task. For this reason, in addition to the fact that we were not
successful at creating a baseline condition, we did not compare recall for the two tasks
(left/right and yes/no) as we had initially planned. This means that although we replicated
the chosen item benefit that we had shown in Experiments 1 and 2, we were unable to
determine if this benefit is due to a memory enhancement for chosen items or a memory
detriment for not chosen items. Nonetheless, we successfully demonstrated that the
chosen item benefit holds even when participants click on the words “left” and “right” to
make choices.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

We designed three experiments to dissociate the congruity effect from the
mnemonic benefit for chosen items. Nairne et al. (2018) showed in two experiments that
participants remembered more words that had been chosen as being more useful to a
given situation than unchosen alternatives, suggesting that there may be a mnemonic
benefit for chosen words over unchosen. However, in those experiments choice was
confounded with congruity – that is, the words that were chosen were also more
congruent with the situation. For that reason, it was unclear whether there was a benefit
for chosen words over unchosen words, or merely a benefit for congruent words over
incongruent words. In the current experiments, we disentangled choice and congruity
effects by having participants make half of their choices based on which word was more
congruent and the other half of their choices based on which word was less congruent.
We found in three experiments that not only did participants have better memory
for congruent words than incongruent words, but they also had better memory for chosen
words than for unchosen words. Furthermore, these effects did not interact– that is, the
size of the choice effect did not depend on the level of congruity between the word and
the encoding situation/category. These results suggest that something other than
congruity is responsible for the chosen-item mnemonic benefit.
We also found that the chosen item benefit did not depend on participants
physically interacting with the word while making their selections. In the third
experiment, we replicated the pattern of effects found in Experiments 1 and 2 but
crucially, participants did not click on the chosen word to make their decisions, instead
they clicked on the words “left” or “right” to choose which of the two words they wanted
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to select. This indicates that the choice benefit found in Experiments 1 and 2 was not an
artifact of increased attention induced by having participants choose the word by clicking
on it with the computer mouse.
In Experiment 3 another goal was to compare recall of chosen and unchosen
words to a baseline condition. The purpose of this comparison was to see if the
mnemonic difference between chosen and unchosen items was due to a memory
enhancement for the chosen items or due to memory impairment for the unchosen items.
Unfortunately, we were unable to compare these two conditions because we did not
successfully create a baseline condition against which to compare the choice task. When
participants made yes/no judgments regarding sentences about which of two words was
more (or less) representative of a category, we found a benefit for words that had been
given a “yes” response over those that have been given a “no” response, as well as a
benefit for congruent words over incongruent words. In short, the pattern of results in the
yes/no condition mimicked the pattern found in the choice task. Considering that both
Staresina et al. (2009) and Marks et al. (1992) obtained a congruity effect but no effect of
response type (yes/no) it is unclear why we found a benefit for “yes” responses. It is
possible that our failure to replicate their null effect of response type was due to the
memory test that we used. Staresina et al. (2009) used a recognition memory test to
measure memory for the items and Marks et al. (1992) used both recognition and cued
recall tasks. It is possible that this response type effect is only present in free recall tasks
and not in cued recall or recognition memory. Additional experiments are needed to
determine if this is the case.
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Because we were unable to compare the choice task to a baseline task, we were
not able to gain additional information about the source of the mnemonic benefit for
chosen items. Thus, the question remains: Why are chosen items better remembered than
unchosen items? Because congruity cannot account for the benefit of chosen items over
unchosen items we can rule out Toyota and Kobayashi's (2009) integration hypothesis as
an explanation of the chosen item benefit. They claimed that if participants have a clear
dimension along which to make their choices, then their choices will be more memorable
because they will be better integrated into existing cognitive structures (Toyota, 2015).
We found that the effect of choice did not depend on level of congruity meaning that
better integration of items into cognitive schemas does not change the effect of choice.
Given that we observed both a benefit for chosen over unchosen items as well as a
benefit for items that had been given a “yes” response, it could be that there is something
about the act of endorsing an item that improves memory for that item. It is possible that
this effect is related to the mere ownership effect (e.g., Beggan, 1992). When someone
chooses something, even if they are choosing it as being less useful for survival, they feel
a sense of ownership over the choice which may then lead to better memory for the
chosen item. An alternative explanation is that value drives the mnemonic benefit for
chosen items. It has been suggested that due to the vast amount of information humans
encounter daily, it is important that we selectively remember information that is
important or relevant while forgetting information that is not (Stefanidi, Ellis, & Brewer,
2018). It has been shown that participants have better memory for items that are assigned
a higher value at encoding (Ariel & Castel, 2014; Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007; Stefanidi
et al., 2018), an effect known as value-directed remembering. If subjects perceive things
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that they choose or endorse as being more valuable, then value-directed remembering
could account for the mnemonic benefit of chosen items over unchosen items. Neither of
these accounts, however, provides much insight into the proximate mnemonic
mechanisms that actually produce the advantage. We have shown that chosen items are
more memorable than unchosen items, and that this chosen-item effect is independent of
the effect of contextual congruity, but more research is needed to determine what causes
this chosen-item benefit.
It is also important to investigate how the chosen-item benefit can be harnessed to
improve learning outcomes. Pedagogical aids that induce choice, particularly of a correct
over an incorrect answer, are likely to aid learning relative to a pure study condition.
There is now considerable evidence that retrieval practice, during which people recall or
endorse items that have occurred previously, can significantly improve long-term
learning (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). One could conceive of choice as a form of
retrieval practice, albeit one in which people access prior knowledge rather than temporal
occurrence to provide a response. Perhaps assigning students to do easy multiple-choice
questions (questions where they would be able to successfully select the correct answer
most of the time) for home work would lead to better final exam performance. In addition
to the implications of this research for the field of education, this work has potential
application in the field of consumer science. If consumers choose one product over
another, say because it is on sale, it could improve their memory for that product in the
future.
In summary, we conducted three experiments which showed that the mnemonic
benefit for chosen items is independent of the congruity effect – that is, participants have
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better memory for chosen items and for congruent items, but the effect of choice does not
depend on whether items are congruent or incongruent. This suggests that the chosenitem effect is caused by something other than the congruity of the items to the encoding
situation. These experiments will hopefully lay a foundation for future research
investigating the source of the chosen-item effect as well as potential applications for this
effect in the fields such as education. It is important that we explore and improve our
understanding of the effect of choice on memory. Choices are an integral part of our
lives; we choose what to eat, which products to consume, and how to delegate our time
(to name only a few examples). As shown in these experiments, such simple choices can
influence our memory.
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FOOTNOTE

1

For a within-subject ANOVA in G*Power 3.1, the program assumes only one

within-subjects factor (and in this case, one between). Our design had two within-subject
factors, and thus, the estimated sample size is a conservative estimate of sample size
because it does not take into account the correlation between the congruent and
incongruent conditions.
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENT 1 STIMULI

Word Pairs
basket
lemon
football
bullet
ruler
bowl
purse
dress
watch
flag
fork
trumpet
pipe
sponge
pencil
drum
book
saw
umbrella
sock
rope
telephone
bread
belt
lamp
boot
key
apple
candy
tie
hammer
cake
vase
hat
jar
bell
shirt
cup
envelope
whistle
map
candle
ring
pillow
bottle
doll
broom
tomato
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APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTS 2 AND 3 STIMULI AND
CATEGORIES

golf
sleet
dollar
drill
ruby
coal
beer
sofa
floor
copper
bowl
door
bell
piano
wool
yard
daisy
glove
week
maple

Word Pairs
boot
tent
noun
doll
book
boat
grass
corn
kite
waltz
valley
grape
sage
rake
salt
knife
juice
chapel
rock
iron

Categories - Version A
A sport
A type of human dwelling
A kind of money
A toy
A precious stone
A transportation vehicle
An alcoholic beverage
A vegetable
A part of a building
A type of dance
A kitchen utensil
A fruit
A thing that makes noise
A gardener’s tool
A type of fabric
A weapon
A flower
A building for religious services
A unit of time
A chemical element

Categories - Version B
A type of footwear
A weather phenomenon
A part of speech
A carpenter’s tool
A type of reading material
A fuel
A thing that is green
An article of furniture
A thing that flies
A metal
A natural earth formation
A thing made of wood
An herb
A musical instrument
A substance for flavoring food
A unit of distance
A liquid
An article of clothing
A type of music
A tree

